Introduction
In past decades, many countries and regions including emerging Russia, India and China, and developed Hong Kong experienced rapid growth, but the benefits of economic growth are not equally shared by the people. Actually, often a major proportion of the benefit of economic development goes to a minority of people, while the majority of people do not enjoy the benefit of economic development but suffer from it instead, because high economic growth often is followed by a widening income gap and soaring consumer as well as property prices. This indicates that income distribution is a very important factor influencing social welfare and social welfare policy urgently needs to be adjusted to enhance social welfare.
Recently this issue has become a hot topic on websites and drawn more and more attention from economists and politicians all over the world. In many countries calls for income redistribution reform and demonstrations against income policies are a frequent occurrence. If this situation is not handled properly, social and political stability may be unavoidably threatened and harmed. Therefore, governments of concerned countries and regions have to take steps to meet the potential threat to social and political stability.
The social welfare function is an eternal topic in welfare economics. It is a real-value function that ranks conceivable social states (alternative complete descriptions of the society) from lowest to highest. Inputs of the function include any variables considered to affect welfare of the society (Sen, 1970) , but most of the variables can be measured in monetary terms.
The social welfare function closely relates to social choice in a democratic society and capitalist markets (Arrow, 1963) , social welfare evaluation, income distribution, tax policies and other issues in macroeconomic management. It also closely relates to the micro-foundation of macroeconomics and is seen as a bridge from microeconomics to macroeconomics. Without in depth understanding of how the social welfare function is formulated, one would not understand if and how a macro variable can be aggregated from different micro variables, or a social preference from different individual preferences.
Although studies on the relationship of social welfare to income distribution have a long history, economists have not reached an agreement on the framework for the social welfare function. Early development of welfare economics was pushed forward by classical utilitarianism economist Edgeworth (1881) , and his followers, Marshall (1890) and Pigou (1920) . Utilitarianism economists assume that individual utility or happiness from goods and services consumption can be measured and compared with the same value scale called "utils". The classical social welfare function is defined as the sum of utilities of all the members of the society: ) receives an equal weight, implying that one extra unit of utility for a starving person is not seen to be of any greater value than an extra unit of utility for a millionaire.
Utilitarian economists also borrow some findings of psychologists as a prerequisite of economic theory. As an example, diminishing marginal utility was widely quoted as law after the marginal revolution initiated by Walras (1874) and Marshall (1890) .
From the 1930s, "economists came to be persuaded by arguments presented by Robbins (1938) and others (deeply influenced by "logical positivist" philosophy) that interpersonal comparisons of utility had no scientific basis" (Sen, 1999) . Robbins strongly opposed the view of utilitarianism on the interpersonal comparability of utilities. He said, "Every mind is inscrutable to every other mind and no common denominator of feelings is possible" (Robbins, 1938) , and thus the epistemic foundations of utilitarian welfare economics were seen as incurably defective.
With the sweeping influence of Robbins's standpoint and the introduction of the indifference curve, leading economists in this field became adverse to subjective concepts and hostile to cardinal and interpersonally comparable utilities (Ng Yew-Kwang, 1997) . It marked a turning point of welfare economics, where old welfare economics began to decline and new welfare economics started to rise.
From the 1940s onward, economists devoted a great deal of effort to the axiomatic set-up regarding the existence of the social welfare function and the possibility of social choice. The most widely adopted frameworks were formulated by Bergson (1938) and Samuelson (1947 
As a result, following the frameworks formulated by Bergson (1938) and Arrow (1951 Arrow ( , 1963 ), Arrow's impossibility theorem and its many variants were introduced (Parks, 1976; Kemp and Ng, 1976; Pollak, 1976; and Hammond, 1976; Kaplow and Shavell, 1999) .
Regarding the relationship of Arrow's impossibility theorem to Bergson-Samuelson' s social welfare function, insightful analysis has been made by Little (1950) , Rothenberg (1953) , Sen (1973 Sen ( , 1979 ways that are similar to the Arrow Impossibility theorem." (Sen, 1977) .
With the reemergence of the neoclassical utilitarianism in the 1970s, many social welfare functional forms were developed (see table 1 ). The neoclassical utilitarianism social welfare function is expressed as
given a discrete probability distribution Neoclassical utilitarianism defines the social welfare function as the expected utility function under risk, where the probability distribution is known. However, no agreement has been reached so far on whether or not preferences are interpersonally comparable, and the debate on this issue continues.
Rawls' social function captures ethical judgment of justice and equity, the key philosophical point about social welfare, but it is criticized for paying too much attention to the poorest and neglecting the coordination of the poorest with others. Rawl's rule may discourage people from working hard and probably lead to social resources being used inefficiently. In the long run, if resources are not used efficiently in a society, the society would eventually fail in allowing people to live their lives with dignity.
Sen's social welfare function and Foster's social welfare function are similar in that both are expressed as a multiplication of average income and an equality index; the difference lies in that they use different equality indexes. It is a pity that neither Sen's nor Foster's social welfare function is based on preference axioms and economic rationality. Therefore, it is not clear whether the Gini index or the Theil index better measures social welfare.
The major purposes of this paper are, firstly, to investigate the logic of impossibility theorems and to find a way to escape from impossibility; secondly, to set up a unifying framework for social welfare evaluation under imperfect information and ambiguity; and thirdly, to identify factors that influence social welfare, obtain an analytical form of the social welfare function, and then discuss characteristics of the social welfare function. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, a literature review is made about impossibility of social choice and the relativity of preference and the importance of reference frame in social welfare evaluation is discussed. In section 3, the role of moral judgments and its relationship with social welfare evaluation is investigated, and the possibility of taking moral judgments of social welfare evaluation is considered. In section 4, the latest important theoretical progress in modeling ambiguity is sketched and its possible applications in social welfare evaluation are analyzed. The importance of a reference frame in social welfare evaluation was ever mentioned by (Rothenberg, 1953) , Tversky and Kahneman (1986) . It seems to me that the importance of reference frame to social welfare evaluation is somewhat like a reference frame to Classical Physics and Theory of Relativity by created by Einstein.
In special relativity theory in physics, both time and space are relative concepts and depend on a reference frame in which people observe the natural world. Observers see different phenomena in different reference points. However, physical rules that the motion of matter follows are the same, and independent of special reference frames. (1781) and Condorcet (1785) ; the use of different persons' utility rankings without any interpersonal comparison is analytically quite similar to the use of voting information in making social choice" (Sen, 1999) . Therefore, an Arrow-type impossibility theorem is only relevant to social choice issues such as the voting process and is silence on income distribution that is related to the social welfare function.
Although cardinal measurability is important to social welfare evaluation (Ng, 1976 (Ng, , 1999 Sen, 1999) , in Sen's viewpoint, introduction of cardinal measurability cannot help to escape from impossibility. He pointed out "Admitting cardinality of utilities without interpersonal comparisons does not change
Arrow's impossibility theorem at all, which can be readily extended to cardinal measurability." (Sen, 1977) Therefore, impossibility has little to do with cardinal measurability, but has much to do with Arrow's immoderate hypothesis. Sen claimed that impossibility can be avoided by dropping any row's assumptions (Sen, 1977 ).
Arrow's universal domain assumption is also irrelevant because it highlights too much about the difference of preferences between individuals and ignores their similarities. "How preferences are specifically influenced may reflect culture, social convention or custom, so that they are context dependent. But whatever the cause, this may create sufficient restrictions on the preference domain that collective rationality results as a consequence of some aggregation procedure that is democratic. 1 The independence axiom is criticized for its ruling out information that is valuable to comparison of preference intensity.
The above analysis shows that there would be no future if welfare economics continued to be restricted in Bergson-Samuelson and Arrow's frameworks. To escape from impossibility, it is necessary to set up a theoretical framework that distinguishes from Bergson-Samuelson and Arrow's.
A few ways mentioned help to escape from impossibility. The simplest way is to assume that all individuals have the same preferences, which is in contrast with Arrow's universal domain condition.
This assumption is widely used in policy analysis (Mirlees, 1971; Sadka, 1976) .
The second way is to assume that preferences are full cardinally measurable and interpersonal comparable. Because aggregation of cardinal utility must involve an arithmetic operation which requires every term in the utility functions to have a specific unit, scale and reference point, no one 1 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, p896.
has so for claimed to be able to have such information. Moreover, such a strong assumption has long been rejected by new welfare economists because full cardinal measurability and interpersonal comparability are not easily accepted by all individuals and I don't recommend adopting such assumptions. Although someone may conceive that a machine measuring people's happiness may be created someday, it is better to avoid full comparability before the machine is created.
The third way is to assume that social welfare is evaluated by an entity with a special position in a society. The entity can be either a dictator or a group of team members. A government can also be seen as such an entity. Introduction of government has clear policy implications since social welfare can be adjusted by government policies.
Generally, the social decision process is complicated and can be classified into three phases: voting, policy-making and implementation, and policy revision or improvement. Official election of the government can be either democratic or autocratic. Most democratic countries elect their leader following a certain voting procedure. The reasonableness of election procedures is challenged by the Arrow impossibility theorem and is a main theme of social choice theory. Once a government leader is elected, the social decision process goes to the second phase, policy making and implementation. In this phase, government can be seen as a dictator. Most policies in this phase are generally formulated independent of voting for the time being; at most, the policies are made after discussion by a committee -a group of team members who usually share similar preferences with its government leader (because the team members are nominated by the leader). This makes it reasonable to assume that government policy is made approximately under dictatorship. Since the policies are made under ambiguity and imperfect information in the second phases, some problems may be discovered during implementation, and it is possible that policy made in the second phase will be examined and criticized by the public. In this case, policies formulated in the second phase should be improved. This implies that public opinions have some impact on government preference and force the government to change preference to meet various situations. Public opinions can also be strong enough to cause the old government to be replaced by a new government. Therefore, in the third phase policy would be adjusted to meet the new social environment, responding to public opinions and comments. In short, social welfare valuation could be seen as a process in which the government evaluates social welfare according to its preference. The Rawlsian social welfare function and the elite welfare function can be seen as special types of social welfare functions that respectively represent the poorest and the richest. Because social welfare is, to a large extent, determined by government policies and institutional changes, compared with an individualistic social welfare function, the government preference based social welfare function obviously has strong policy implications.
The above discussion indicates that that there is a need to choose a reference frame when evaluating social welfare to escape from impossibility. Given a reference frame, everyone can value social welfare in his own reference frame, but only government valuation is policy relevant. If social welfare is evaluated by a team whose members have similar preferences, agreement on social welfare function may be easily reached.
Therefore, the government plays a role as if it were a dictator in Arrow's framework, and it is feasible and meaningful to assume that the government is an independent rational entity that represents all social members, even though social preference is imposed for some members.
Moral Judgement and Rationality
It is not sufficient to obtain the social welfare function if only a reference frame is chosen. To escape from impossibility, Arrow's specifications should be relaxed; on the other hand, some restrictions, which can be seen as non-utility information or essentials of rationality, should be added to the profile of the social welfare function. The restrictions reflect similarities in moral value judgement between individuals. The similarities are either due to common culture background, convention, custom, social policies or laws imposed.
Generally, three moral judgments: justice, equity and efficiency, and decision rule, are to be taken into consideration in social welfare evaluation. The first is related to the trade-off between efficiency and equality. Income inequality in terms of the Gini coefficient is seen as an important reference indicator of government policy. Experience has indicated that if income inequality is too small, it may cause inefficient resource allocation; on the other side, if income inequality is too large, it may lead many people to participate in street demonstrations and even cause social and political instability. To prevent unexpected things from happening, the government may find, according to its past and international experiences, that the Gini coefficient should be controlled within a specific interval. For example, people may agree that an ideal society should not distribute income so evenly that nobody has the motivation to work; at the same time, however, income should not be distributed so unevenly that most people are not satisfied with it. Such value judgement has a strong policy implication, that is, income distribution policy should be adjusted so that income inequality is at a moderate interval and reflects a trade-off between efficiency and fairness.
The second moral judgement is justice and inequality aversion. Justice in most theories was placed in a special position. According to Rawls (1971) "Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought." In a just society, social and economic inequalities are arranged so that: a) they are of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of the society (difference principle), and b) offices and positions must be open to everyone with fair and equal opportunity.
In modern society, the security line is thought to be an important consideration of social welfare policy, under which whoever has income lower than the security line is entitled to subsistence. It is the government's responsibility to adjust income distribution and make sure that each individual's living standard is raised above the minimum security line. Policy should guarantee minimum wages and a living standard for the benefit of the poor. However, the principle of justice is not all that is necessary for a society to run successfully. In traditional socialist China, equality was a top priority of government; each able person was promised a job in order to meet basic living needs. However, this institutional arrangement lowers competition and reduces efficiency, and in the ends the society could not produce enough food, clothes and other goods to satisfy the basic needs of people. It was Deng Xiaoping who recognized the weakness of the traditional mandatory economic system and the inefficiency of "big pot rice", and launched economic reform and opened door to the outside world in 1978, in order to "let some of the people to be better off first and then realize common prosperity." Deng's idea represents one of the most important value judgments of China at that time.
The third moral judgment is related to rational decision rules. Rationality in economics can be expressed in different ways depending on the nature of problems. In a world with no risk and uncertainty, rationality refers to the behavior of an economic entity that follows preference axioms, and efficiently allocates economic resources. In a world with risk, where probability distribution is given, rationality can be characterized with the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. In this case, the rational principle of utility maximization is naturally replaced by expected utility maximization.
However, not every phenomenon in the real world can be measured in terms of probability. Knight (1921) recognized that some phenomena cannot be expressed in a single probability distribution.
Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961) further demonstrated by experiments that inconsistency may arise between actual observed choices and predictions of expected utility theory. Ellsberg's experiments also showed that some choices cannot be rationalized by subjective expected utility (SEU) introduced by Savage (1954) . In an uncertain world, where random phenomena cannot be represented by probability measures, rationality could characterize by expected utility maximization under ambiguity.
As in risky and uncertain environments where expected utility maximization under risk is regarded as the moral judgment of an economic person, expected utility maximization also applies to social welfare issues. However, perhaps because the possibility of social choice and the existence of the social welfare function dominate research in this field, no one, as far as I know, has so far developed a model linking ambiguity to social welfare evaluation. In the next section of this paper, the NeumannMorgenstern utility function government is assumed to be an entity aiming to maximize social welfare in terms of expected utility according to its own reference frame.
Ambiguity and Social Welfare Evaluation
It would be ideal for a theory to be supported by perfect information. However, unfortunately perfect information is generally unavailable in the real world. For example, in financial markets, one may observe asset price but not completely observe its rate of return and its volatility; regarding the social welfare state, only a part of people's income data are available and no one can get the information about all social members; specifically, one may estimate the mean and Gini coefficients of the income of a population, and not necessarily know the income and income distribution of all the society. Even the official statistical department can do nothing to help if a population is large enough. In the real world, noise from information asymmetry and counterfeit data are also puzzling. Traditional welfare economics is silent in such cases because "The concept of an objectively measurable probability or chance is simply inapplicable" (Knight, 1921) . With efforts by economists and mathematicians many models associated with ambiguity have been developed to cover Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes so far. Here I just mention a few of them, which I think are relevant.
Let Ω be a given set of states, S denotes the set of relevant states of the world Ω ∈ ω , and C a set of outcomes R C ⊂ ; let H be a linear space of real functions defined on Ω such that
denotes the space of continuous functions with polynomial growth, i.e., there exists constants C and
H is considered as a space of "random variables" (Peng, 2007) .
In case random phenomena cannot be described by a single linear probability measure, it is natural for a decision maker to think in terms of a set of probability measures. The multiple priors model proposed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) postulates the following utility function on the set of Anscombe-Aumann (1963) (AA) acts:
is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functional. P , the set of priors p , is a set of probability measures on Ω . The multiple priors model captures the character of an ambiguous event stated in the Ellsberg paradox and gives ambiguous problems a formal mathematical representation.
The MP model is sometimes criticized on the grounds that it implies extreme aversion to ambiguity and does not capture the magnitude of ambiguity aversion.
To overcome the deficiencies of the MP model, Klibanoff, Marincci and Mukerji (2005) , proposed a
Smooth Ambiguity Model in which a utility KMM U is expressed over AA acts:
Here,
is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function as before. µ is a probability measure over ) (C ∆ , representing model uncertainty, and φ is continuous and strictly increasing on C. Epstein and Schneider (2010) pointed out that the multiple priors model is a limited case of the smooth ambiguity model, if P is supporting of µ and the degree of concavity of φ increases without bound. Ambiguity attitude is captured in this model by the shape of φ , and it is seen as an advantage of the MP model. If φ is concave, then the individual is ambiguity averse and greater concavity implies greater ambiguity. On the other hand, ambiguity itself seems to be captured by µ , and thus it is claimed that the KMM model separates ambiguity and attitude of aversion to ambiguity. The separation of ambiguity aversion and ambiguity is another advantage of this model (Epstein and Schneider, 2010) . However, the smooth model faces difficulties since there is little information available about the measure of µ , which means that µ itself faces uncertainty. = dp dp dp p p R 
Here, 
However, various ambiguity models themselves don't tell where they apply. Obviously, whether or not a type of ambiguity model is adopted depends on the context of problems. Without taking account of the context, it is difficult to identify which better describes practical problems.
The above static models are studied in static situations; in past decades some progress has been made in dynamic situations. With the help of backward stochastic differential equations, the MP model was generalized to link two important concepts: g-expectation by Peng (1997) , and further studied by Chen and Epstein (2002) 
Under some moderate assumptions it is shown that sublinear expectations can be represented by the MP model. Artzner et al. (1999) establish the links between sublinear expectation with coherent risk measure.
5.
Modeling and Solving Social Welfare Functional
Objective Function and Constraints
Assume that individual income of a society is represented by a random variable X distributed on ) , 0 ( +∞ = + R . It is well know that there generally are an infinite number of distributions corresponding to a given Gini coefficient, so a natural question that one would ask is which of the distributions is the best from the perspective of society, in other words, which of the distributions with given Gini coefficient G maximizes social welfare. Pushing this issue a step further, the government may conceive of an interval for G such as
Once G is outside of the interval, some policy will be adopted to let G return inside of the interval. This problem is associated with ambiguity and moral judgments stated previously. The moral judgments constitute constraints of the social objective, and they thus are elements of collective rationality.
Hypothesis 1: Taking justice as the moral judgment of a society, the government is obligated to consider the basic needs of every person of the society and ensure everyone lives with a dignity life; a reasonable assumption is that the minimum income or security line m x (>0) is a major consideration of policy making. This policy is expected to be equally shared by people whether they are poor or rich at present. Therefore, the random income is restricted by such a policy to take value only from interval Hypothesis 2: Within the multiple priors framework, X is distributed with a set of continuously differentiable probability distributions denoted by
, where, µ is the expectation of income, G denotes the Gini coefficient of income, m x is variable minimum income. Let P denote the set of income distributions with given expectation µ and Gini coefficient
, then the distribution set P can be expressed as:
captures the "trade-off" between equity and efficiency as an important consideration of the government, meaning that the income gap should be large enough to guarantee efficiency and should not be too large so as to cause social instability. 
Under multiple priors, the social objective is to maximize social welfare of the society through income redistribution. Therefore, the purpose of solving the maximization problem of the social welfare function is to find distribution P F ∈ * so that social welfare is maximized:
If the income distribution * F defined in the objective function (5) exists, then * F is called the optimal income distribution function and
is the optimal social welfare function.
Modeling Social Welfare Function
According to hypothesis stated above, the social welfare problem can be rewritten as a standard variational problem with objective function (7) integral constraints (8) and (9), and boundary conditions (11) and (12).
and boundary conditions
The Lagrangian is
The first order condition of the problem is Euler-Lagrange equation
Since Theorem 1 tells us that the optimal distribution is determined by social preference or the utility function.
Once the utility function is known, a specific expression of the optimal distribution function can be obtained. The distribution function is a decreasing function of marginal utility. On the other hand, by taking the first derivative on both sides of the optimal distribution, we have Corollary 2: social preference and income distribution obtained in theorem 1 is satisfied with the second ordinary differential equation: ( )
x is not independent but endogenously determined by expected income µ and the Gini coefficient G .
Their relation can be written as: (5), the social welfare function can be obtained.
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Noticing that in the derivation process of social welfare function, the boundedness of
, and (19) is applied.
The social welfare function is actually transformed to be a function of µ and G , it is clear that only when G G = , the social welfare function reaches its minimum value, and thus (17) is proved.
Theorem 5 tells us that there are three ways to promote social welfare levels: to increase the consumer surplus of the poorest, the average of the social wealth, or decrease inequality. Since the wealth of the poorest is positively associated with expected wealth µ and the Gini coefficient G , social welfare must be a function of
, the product of average income and (1-Gini coefficient).
Next two corollaries show Rawls's social welfare function and Sen's welfare function can be seen as two special cases of Theorem 5. 
. This is absolute equivalent of distribution and can be seen as a special case of Rawls's social welfare function.
Corollary 7 indicates that Sen' binary social welfare function can be derived from the framework of maximization under ambiguity and has its rational foundations. However, Sen's social welfare function was originally not based on such foundations (see Deaton, 1980) .
The above discussion is based on four hypotheses and the law of diminishing marginal utility.
However, although diminishing marginal utility has been claimed as law and is supported by many empirical studies (Greene & Baron, 2001) , some modern behavioral economists are skeptical about the concavity of the utility function being applicable anywhere of an interval considered. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) who developed prospect theory argued that the shape of the value function varies with asset position. There may be a reference point and the positive or negative change from that point is represented by the payoff in question. The value function that passes through the reference point is S-shaped and, as its asymmetry implies, there is a bigger impact of losses than of gains (loss aversion) on valuation given the same variation in absolute value. They concluded that over a quite broad range, the value function is concave in the domain of gain and convex in the domain of loss.
In the following theorem 8, I list results about the social welfare function when the utility function is concave. The S-shaped utility related social welfare function is more complicated and I will discuss them in another paper.
is a continuously differentiable, increasing bounded and convex utility function, and
, then there must be a probability distribution of income ) (
which maximizes social welfare, and the social welfare function can be represented by
Implication of the Minimum Income and Feature of Welfare Function
In the discussion below, I return to the assumption that the utility function is concave and the other assumptions do not change. Let
are not independent from each other, and their relation is determined by
It is easy to show by simple operations that h and m x are positively related, that is the following relations are true:
Intuitively, equation (22) and (23) inverse function of h ; second, at the optimal condition, the minimum income m x should be increasing with the product of average income with the difference between one and the Gini coefficient, which is called real income or Sen's social welfare function. Equations (24) and (25) imply that social welfare is positively related with the living conditions of the poorest and an effective way to promote social welfare is by improving the conditions of the poorest. Equation (26) demonstrates that the welfare function is concave with respect to
If we compare the optimal social welfare function
with the other existing one, we find that the optimal social welfare function in this paper better expresses the meaning of social welfare in that the optimal social welfare function is determined by the minimum income, average income and inequality measures, while others take only one or two of the factors into consideration. Moreover, the most important and attractive characteristic of the optimal social welfare function is that it takes both level variable sand structural variables into consideration.
Relativity and Invariance
The relativity of the social welfare function is based on the relativity of preferences. Relativity of preferences implies that each individual has his or her own preferences that can be described by a special utility function. When an individual measures social welfare based on his own standard or measure, the social welfare function he obtains is only meaningful from his own standpoint. Therefore, any social welfare function that is derived from a special reference frame under certain conditions is logically right, nevertheless, when the reference frame changes, the outcome of social welfare evaluation will change too. Therefore, any social welfare function is a relative truth, and no social welfare function is meaningful for every one. This is the relativity of the social welfare function.
However, since any individual preference follows preference axioms and certain moral norms and conventions, making different individual preference has some similarities; social welfare functions obtained in different reference frames must have some commonalities, indicating that there is something interpersonally comparable, not totally incomparable. From their commonalities some general laws can be found; mathematically they are invariant under a specific kind of transformation. This is invariance of the social welfare function. If relativity states the differences between valuations for social welfare, invariance reflects their similarities. 
Since there has been no machine invented to measure utility, there is no reason to force the belief of interpersonal comparability. If we can find a transformation by which a social welfare function can be transformed so that it can be expressed in terms of money, we could conclude that the social welfare function is measurable and interpersonally comparable.
To obtain a comparable social welfare function, let us first standardize the utility function. Given utility function ) (x U , define the standardized utility function of
Now let us turn to comparability and additivity. Since the standardized social welfare function is expressed in terms of money, given any two different utility functions 
. This demonstrates that the same income distribution is valued differently by different people; differences between two social welfare functions equals the difference between their minimum incomes defined respectively by the two persons.
From the left side of equation (27), we see that the social welfare function is a sublinear expectation of a value function; from the right side of the equation, we see that the social welfare function is expressed as the difference between m x and h and this relationship is irrelevant with respect to the specific utility function. Therefore, the standardized social welfare function is robust regarding the standardized utility function. Invariance of the social welfare function here has two implications: on one hand, the invariance of the social welfare function is related to robustness and it refers to a kind of rule or law of social preferences expressed in a mathematical expression. Whatever the standardized utility function
is invariant to a change in the specific form of a utility function, that is, the right side of the formula of the social welfare function is independent of ) (x U ; on the other hand, the invariance of the social welfare function refers to the idea that the social welfare functions are invariant to a group of monotonous increasing transformations. In section 3 we have already proved that m x is an increasing function of 
Similarly, since Sen's social welfare function is a special case of the social welfare function obtained in theorem 5, any social welfare function form can be transformed into Sen's function by g:
. Equivalently, for any standardized utility function
there is an increasing function transformation
. This is a generalized invariance principle of the social welfare function.
Economic Welfare and its Policy Implications to Hong Kong and Mainland China
The above theoretical discussion indicates that the social welfare function is not necessarily individualistic; it may be consistent with opinions of all of the society, it may be oligarchy, or dictatorial irrespective of opinions of others, and it also may be determined by some specific rules. In short, any function that follows preference axioms and ranks social states rationally can be regarded as a social welfare function. Mathematically, the social welfare function is a projection of social states on a specific reference frame that represents a specific preference and restriction. Although per capita GNI in PPP offers a partial remedy for the deficiency of nominal GNI, it fails to take into account income inequality and it is not a good indicator of welfare. Our model analysis has demonstrated that equality plays an important role in social welfare and social welfare should be measured with per capita GNI discounted by the Gini coefficient. The United Nations' Human Development database, which provides data on per capita GNI, the Gini coefficient and the economic welfare index of mainland China, Hong Kong, and some other selected countries, shows that the inequality in terms of Gini coefficients in China has experienced a significant rise, and the Gini coefficients in Hong Kong has long been the highest in the developed economies. Table 2 demonstrates that social welfares are not as large as that indicated by GNI. In the case of Russia, its economy has recovered from the collapse of the Soviet Union, but the welfare level is still lower than 20 years ago. China, Brazil, and India's social welfare improved greatly, but it seems not perform so well as their GNI. In past decades, China' economy has benefited from economic reform and opening up policies, but the major benefit of economic growth goes mainly to land and real estate developers, foreign venture enterprises, monopolistic state owned enterprises and the government sector; only a minor part of the benefit is shared by farmers, ordinary workers and employees of non-foreign funded enterprises. A considerable number of people feel that they are marginalized by economic growth, their life quality is worsening and their feeling of happiness is declining.
In terms of PPP, Hong Kong's GNI per capita ranks second to the United States, but its welfare index is the lowest among the developed economies because of its highest income inequality. Therefore, Hong Kong's economy is not so successful from the angle of welfare states. This conclusion is also supported by data from the Hong Kong family survey. According to a recent report of Oxfam Hong Kong (http://www.oxfam.org.hk/en/wageneeds.aspx), poverty has worsened in the past five and a half years among families of low-income workers, and the gap between poor and rich families is at its highest ever. In 2010 Q2, one in every 10 households with at least one working member (10.2%) was living in poverty, with a monthly income less than half the median among families of comparable size. China's minimum wage in different regions ranges in 2010 between 460 and 1,180 yuan, which is clearly lower than the $1 per day poverty line of the United Nations. According to the $1 per day standard, it is reported that there are still over one million people living in poverty.
The raising minimum wage standard may cause other problems. One of the potential problems is to worsen unemployment. Mainland China and Hong Kong are also advised to take concrete steps to adjust the income distribution relationship between government and enterprises, and let more people share the fruit of economic growth. More effort should be made to strengthen medical care, health care and increase social insurance and unemployment insurance coverage.
The Chinese government is also advised to take concrete step to adjust the distribution relationship between the local government and central government, personal income tax, eliminate private use of public resources, rule out government entertainment consumption, and many other corruption actions.
More bonuses of state owned enterprises should be collected to put into social security funds and enable ordinary people to share the benefits of state owned enterprises. A wage ceiling on senior managers of state owned enterprises should be implemented.
Concluding Remarks
The social welfare function is a real-value function associated with preference that ranks conceivable social states. Since preference is a relative concept varying with the reference frame of evaluation and associated with moral judgments. The social welfare function is also a relative concept. In welfare economics, each person values social welfare according to his own preferences. The impossibility theorem is mainly caused by putting different individualistic assumptions together with interpersonal incomparability and other conflicting assumptions. Nevertheless, unconquerable difficulties of social choice under Arrow's framework can be conquered in other frameworks. It is possible to obtain a social welfare function by aggregating different individual preferences.
Inspired by the relativity theory in physics, the author of this paper thinks that to escape from impossibility, it is necessary to choose a given reference frame in which social welfare is evaluated. If one's reference frame is given according to his preference, then social welfare can be evaluated.
Although social welfare can be evaluated in any preference reference frame, only the social welfare function evaluated from the government standpoint has clear implications for policy. In the case in which social welfare is evaluated by a team with similar preferences, agreement on social welfare evaluation may be possible.
Moral judgments are important in social welfare evaluation. This paper takes expected utility maximization under ambiguity as a social welfare objective, and justice, equity and efficiency condition as its constraints. In a risky environment, expected utility maximization is regarded as the moral judgment of a rational economic person; in social welfare evaluation under ambiguity, expected utility maximization also applies. The difference is that decision makers face different contexts.
The paper contributes to economic literature in five aspects. First, it sets up a unifying framework of social welfare evaluation using a decision model under ambiguity, provides a methodology of preference estimation and establishes the relationship between preference and income distribution.
Second, it is shown that some existing social welfare functions such as Sen's social welfare function, Elite's and Rawls's are special cases of the social welfare function obtained here. This indicates that although some other social welfare functions are derived from conditions that are different from this paper, they can be explained by a rational framework.
Third, the social welfare functions obtained here is invariant up to a group of monotonous increasing transformations, and it is proven that social welfare functions obtained from different preferences are at least partly compared because of similarity of preference. Its robustness provides empirical studies with a good alternative model.
Fourth, the social welfare functions obtained here satisfy all axioms of sublinear expectations, and then it can be thought as a generalization of traditional expectations.
Finally, some empirical studies with regard to mainland China and Hong Kong are carried out and policy implications are discussed and recommended. In addition, the framework is found to be flexible enough to contain various variational models and can be extended to involve tax policy analysis.
Therefore, it can be seen as a starting point for later research on the social welfare function. Many problems are left to discuss in a separate paper. 
